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Rebuilding the Texas Railroad Commission
James W. Coleman1
Abstract
This article explains how the Railroad Commission of Texas became the world’s most
prominent oil and gas regulator and how it can become the world’s role model again. It
explains how the Railroad Commission built the world’s modern oil and gas industry by
stopping oil and gas waste and ensuring stable prices. And it describes the crisis now facing
the industry—overproduction of oil and gas is wasting resources that will be worth more in the
future. The United States is emerging from the biggest oil and gas boom that the world has
ever seen and its production now dwarfs that of any other country. Texas now produces far
more oil than any other state, and more than any Middle Eastern country other than Saudi
Arabia. As a result, the eyes of the global oil industry are again on Texas. The article lays out
an agenda for rebuilding a world-class oil and gas regulator, explaining how better data and
smart limits can protect both the economy and the environment.
“The elimination of gas flaring in Texas must be counted as one of the great victories
for conservation in the history of the United States.”
DAVID F. PRINDLE, PETROLEUM POLITICS
COMMISSION (1981)

AND THE

TEXAS RAILROAD

“America’s hottest oil patch is producing so much natural gas that by the end of last
year producers were burning off more than enough of the fuel to meet residential
demand across the whole of Texas.”
KEVIN CROWLEY, PERMIAN BASIN IS FLARING MORE GAS THAN TEXAS
RESIDENTS USE DAILY, BLOOMBERG, APRIL 10, 2019

I. Introduction
The Railroad Commission of Texas is the world’s most prominent oil and gas regulator. Texas
dominated the first seven decades of modern oil production, from the Spindletop blowout in
1901, to the discovery of the East Texas Oil field in 1930, through the energy crisis of the
1970s. From 1931-1953, Texas produced one quarter of the world’s oil.2 Texas fueled the
global economy, powering the United States to global dominance, and creating the modern oil
and gas industry. The Railroad Commission made this American success story possible by
stopping waste of oil and gas and letting the free market work within overall production levels
that it set in coordination with the Interstate Oil Compact Commission and the federal
government.
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James W. Coleman, State Energy Cartels, 42 CARDOZO L. REV. _ (forthcoming 2021)
http://ssrn.com/abstract=3567236; Northcutt Ely, The Conservation of Oil, 51 HARV. L. REV. 1209, 1211 (1938)
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In the past decade, Texas has again moved to the forefront of global oil and gas production.
The United States has become, by far, the world’s leading oil and gas producer. It now produces
more than 60% more oil than the other leading producers, Russia and Saudi Arabia. Texas
alone produces over 40% of U.S. crude oil3—more oil than any other member of the
Organization of Petroleum Exporting Countries other than Saudi Arabia.4 The Texas Railroad
Commission must now show the same leadership to match its world-class industry. Texas is a
global energy superpower and it deserves a world-class regulator.

Figure 15
The Railroad Commission is still the world’s most-watched oil and gas regulator because of
the reputation it developed as it fostered the modern oil industry in the Twentieth Century.
Texas’s production limits ensured that oil and gas was not wasted during times of low prices.
The production limits it negotiated with other states saved Texas’s industry during the Great
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U.S. ENERGY INFO. ADMIN., PETROLEUM & OTHER LIQUIDS: CRUDE OIL PRODUCTION,
https://www.eia.gov/dnav/pet/pet_crd_crpdn_adc_mbblpd_m.htm (Texas produced 5,070 of the United States’s
12,248 thousand barrels per day in 2019).
4
The second most important member of OPEC, Iraq produced just 4.74 million barrels per day in 2019. Texas
produced over 5 million barrels per day in this same period. Railroad Commission of Texas, Texas Monthly Oil
& Gas Production, https://www.rrc.state.tx.us/oil-gas/research-and-statistics/production-data/texas-monthly-oilgas-production/. And the rest of OPEC’s 13 members produced between 4 million barrels per day (UAE) and 167
thousand barrels per day (Equatorial Guinea). U.S. Energy Info. Admin., International: Petroleum and Other
Liquids
Production,
https://www.eia.gov/international/data/world/petroleum-and-other-liquids/annualpetroleum-and-other-liquids-production.
5
U.S. Energy Info. Admin., International: Petroleum and Other Liquids Production,
https://www.eia.gov/international/data/world/petroleum-and-other-liquids/annual-petroleum-and-other-liquidsproduction. International production numbers report “oil” rather than the narrower category of “crude oil” used
for state to state comparisons. This broader category of “oil” includes “other petroleum liquids, biofuels, and
refinery processing gain.” U.S. ENERGY INFO. ADMIN., FREQUENTLY ASKED QUESTIONS: WHAT COUNTRIES ARE
THE TOP PRODUCERS AND CONSUMERS OF OIL?, https://www.eia.gov/tools/faqs/faq.php?id=709&t=6.
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Depression. And its limits on flaring preserved the state’s natural gas. Oil and gas was produced
over time to ensure smooth prices and maximum value for Texas’s industry.
The past decade’s oil boom has pushed the Railroad Commission back to the center of the
world’s stage. Texas regulators have fallen behind the rapid pace of oil production and oil and
gas is once again being wasted. Texas is flaring, leaking, and venting—simply burning off or
releasing—staggering amounts of natural gas and selling oil at rock-bottom prices, or paying
to store it, when it will be worth more in the future. The Commission now may not have enough
data on well-by-well production to begin addressing these problems.6 As a result, companies
are being unnecessarily pushed to waste oil and gas that will be worth far more in the future.
Both our environment and our natural resources are being compromised by a helter-skelter race
for production.
Texas regulators must resume the leadership role appropriate for the world’s dominant oil and
gas producer. This means they must:
1. Reinvigorate the Interstate Oil & Gas Compact Commission to coordinate state oil and
gas policies. With Texas’s leadership, states can work together to address national
problems such as low prices and natural gas flaring, leaking and venting.
2. Work with the Compact Commission, the federal government, and other important
global oil producers to smooth prices and curb overproduction, so that oil and gas are
not wasted during periods of very low prices. The world’s dominant oil producers
always have an interest in negotiating global production cuts to raise global oil prices,
helping all oil producers. Now that America is once again the center of global oil
production it needs to resume this leadership role.
3. Use production cuts to stop widespread natural gas flaring and reduce methane venting
and leaking. Texas and North Dakota both now flare—that is, waste—more natural gas
than some states, and even nations use. It makes no sense to burn off natural gas that
will be worth far more in the future and can be used to replace dirtier sources of energy
and back-up rising solar and wind power.
4. Ensure that state oil and gas regulators have the data they need to effectively conserve
state resources. Companies are using new technology that gives them unprecedented
ability to remotely monitor and fine-tune production at individual wells. But state
regulators do not have the same data. They need to catch up so that they can tailor state
regulation to an ever-faster changing market.
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Anas Alhajji, History Tells Proration Would Cause Chaos In The Texas Oil Patch, FORBES, Apr. 13, 2020,
https://www.forbes.com/sites/anasalhajji/2020/04/13/history-tells-proration-would-cause-chaos-in-the-texas-oilpatch/#e76b9b82e5f2; Cassandra Pollock, Texas Railroad Commissioner Christi Craddick Says Recovering From
Oil and Gas Downturn “Is Going To Be Painful”, TEXAS TRIBUNE, May 12, 2020,
https://www.texastribune.org/2020/05/12/texas-oil-and-gas-production-slowed-during-coronavirus-price-war/
(“Craddick said the questions she had about proration ranged from what the procedure would even look like, since
it had not been done in roughly 50 years, to how the agency could do it correctly.”); Mitchell Ferman, Texas’ Oil
and Gas Regulators Aren’t Ready to Cut Production Yet – They’re Not Even Sure How It Would Work If They
Did, TEXAS TRIBUNE, Apr. 15, 2020, https://www.texastribune.org/2020/04/15/texas-oil-production-cuts-nothappening-yet-railroad-commission/ (“Craddick, who has not indicated what her decision will be, said during the
meeting that she was not sure how they would go about enforcing oil production cuts.”).
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This article explains how the Railroad Commission first became the world’s leading oil & gas
regulator and how it can again become the global leader, serving as a role model for oil and
gas regulators around the world. Part II of this article explains how the Railroad Commission
of Texas built the modern oil and gas industry by stopping waste and ensuring stable prices.
Part III explains the current dilemma—overproduction of oil and gas is wasting resources that
will be worth more in the future. Part IV lays out an agenda for rebuilding a world-class oil and
gas regulator, explaining how better data and smart limits can protect both the economy and
the environment.

II. How The Railroad Commission Stopped Waste and Built the Modern
Oil Industry
The Railroad Commission of Texas may be history’s most important and most poorly named
regulator. In 1917, it was put in charge of Texas’s oil pipelines because oil was also shipped
by rail—so in 1919 it was given control of oil production as well.7 Texas was already the center
of the global oil industry because of the oil rush kicked off by the Spindletop oil gusher on
January 10, 1901.8 But over the following decades this role became more and more important
as world transport, industry, and security grew more and more dependent on oil.9
The Railroad Commission’s role as the world’s premier regulator was cemented in the 1930s
when the discovery of the East Texas oil field and an unprecedented worldwide economic crisis
pushed the Commission to assume new powers over global oil prices. The East Texas oil field
was discovered October 5, 1930 and was soon producing 42% of all U.S. production.10 By
1931, Texas was producing 24% of the entire world’s oil output.11 This flood of oil came in the
early years of the Great Depression, which had drastically reduced oil demand, and a barrel of
oil soon fell from its accustomed price of a dollar to less than a dime.12 These low prices were
a crisis for Texas—its producers were pumping millions and millions of barrels of oil at a loss
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DAVID F. PRINDLE, PETROLEUM POLITICS AND THE TEXAS RAILROAD COMMISSION (1981) 20.
JUDITH WALKER LINSLEY, ELLEN WALKER RIENSTRA, JO ANN STILES, GIANT UNDER THE HILL: HISTORY OF THE
SPINDLETOP OIL DISCOVERY AT BEAUMONT, TEXAS, IN 1901 3 (2002)(“the first six gushes in the Spindletop field
produced more oil per day than all the rest of the fields in the world put together”).
9
James W. Coleman, The Third Age of Oil and Gas Law, 95 IND. L.J. 389, 390–91, 407–08 (2020).
10
Julia Cauble Smith, “East Texas Oil Field” in HANDBOOK OF TEXAS ONLINE (2011) (“By mid-summer of 1931
operators were producing approximately 900,000 barrels of oil per day from about 1,200 wells.”); U.S. ENERGY
INFO. ADMIN., PETROLEUM & OTHER LIQUIDS: U.S. FIELD PROD. OF CRUDE OIL,
https://www.eia.gov/dnav/pet/hist/LeafHandler.ashx?n=pet&s=mcrfpus2&f=a (U.S. produced 2,145,000 barrels
per day in 1931); DIANA DAVIDS HINTON & ROGER M. OLIEN, OIL IN TEXAS: THE GUSHER AGE, 1895–1945 (2002)
170.
11
Coleman, State Energy Cartels, supra note 2. Production data can be found here: Railroad Comm’n of Tex.,
Crude Oil Production and Well Counts (since 1935), https://www.rrc.state.tx.us/oil-gas/research-andstatistics/production-data/historical-production-data/crude-oil-production-and-well-counts-since-1935/ and in
yearly U.S. Mineral Yearbooks. E.g. O.E. KIESSLING, U.S. DEPT. OF COMM., BUR. OF MINES, MINERAL
RESOURCES OF THE UNITED STATES: 1931 (1932) at A-65 (showing Texas production in 1930 and 1931). For U.S.
production see U.S. ENERGY INFO. ADMIN., PETROLEUM & OTHER LIQUIDS: U.S. FIELD PROD. OF CRUDE OIL. For
global production see 2006 ENERGY INFO. ADMIN. ANN. ENERGY REV. 309 tbl.11.5. For world production see
BOUDA ETEMAD ET AL., WORLD ENERGY PRODUCTION, 1800-1985 (1998) available at
https://theshiftdataportal.org/energy#Oil.
12
Northcutt Ely, Legal History of Conservation of Oil and Gas. A Symposium, 53 HARV. L. REV. 1070, 1072
(1940) (reviewing Legal History of Conservation of Oil and Gas: A Symposium (1938)); PRINDLE, supra note 7,
at 26.
8
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when they would have been worth far more if they simply left them in the ground until they
could be produced later at a profit.
Why would companies engage in such economically irrational behavior, spending millions to
pump oil at a loss when they could simply wait and pump the oil later at a profit? The answer
is that free markets in oil always operate in the context of laws that artificially encourage or
restrict oil production.13 Until Texas imposed production controls, state and federal laws
pushed companies to continue wastefully rapid production.
Like all U.S. states, Texas imposes the rule of capture on oil—if you wait to pump oil from
your land, your neighbor may entirely drain a reservoir underlying your two properties.14 As a
result, companies cannot delay production until it would be most profitable.
Even worse, oil companies generally produce oil under leases from landowners that include
court-imposed clauses forcing them to forfeit their rights if they do not quickly find oil and
unceasingly produce it.15 So even when rock-bottom prices make producing unprofitable,
companies must drill for oil and keep pumping it at a loss if they hope to ever make a profit in
the future.
Finally, U.S. antitrust law prevents companies from working together to reduce production.16
It may be somewhat counterintuitive, but if companies were allowed to freely negotiate, they
would agree to reduce their output. Restricted production would raise prices so that every
company’s cash flow would increase even as it sold less. As Adam Smith put it: “People of the
same trade seldom meet together, even for merriment and diversion, but the conversation ends
in a conspiracy against the public, or in some contrivance to raise prices.”17 So if the
government doesn’t help companies coordinate production limits, its antitrust laws force
companies to waste vast quantities of oil during periods of low prices.
So oil and gas law pushes artificially rapid production and depletion of oil and gas. Rapid
production and depletion means wild swings in oil prices, that would be smoothed out if
companies were given more choice about when they produced oil and gas, allowing them to
slow oil production when prices are low so they could pump more when prices are high.18
Companies need the government’s help to coordinate production limits because they cannot do
so themselves without violating antitrust laws.

13

Of course, free markets themselves are legally constructed—they are only possible because legal rules enable
and enforce contracts, property rights, and commerce. CASS R. SUNSTEIN, FREE MARKETS AND SOCIAL JUSTICE
(1997) 5 (“Free markets” are a “legal construct” that “depend for their existence on law” that is “coercive”
including “a system of private property” and “the law of contract”).
14
Coleman, Third Age, supra note 9, at 393–98 (2020)(explaining the rule of capture and how it creates a race to
produce oil).
15
Id. at 398–406. Many of these clauses were imposed by the courts, not freely agreed contracts, because the
courts believed that oil companies otherwise ignored landowners interest in rapid production. Id. at 403 n.73;
Bruce M. Kramer, The Interaction Between the Common Law Implied Covenants to Prevent Drainage and Market
and the Federal Oil and Gas Lease, 15 J. ENERGY NAT. RESOURCES & ENVTL. L. 1, 1-8 (1995).
16
James W. Coleman, “Energy Competition: From Commodity to Boutique & Back,” in COMPETITION LAW AND
ECONOMICS (Klaus Mathis ed., 2019).
17
ADAM SMITH, AN INQUIRY INTO THE NATURE AND CAUSES OF THE WEALTH OF NATIONS (1776) 54.
18
ROBERT MCNALLY, CRUDE VOLATILITY: THE HISTORY AND THE FUTURE OF BOOM-BUST OIL PRICES (2019) 23 (explaining why oil markets suffer from “extreme price volatility” unless production is coordinated by
companies or governments).
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The Texas Railroad Commission met the 1931 crisis by accepting a leadership role as
coordinator of global oil production, eventually overcoming initial resistance by the courts. In
April 1931, the Railroad Commission imposed limits on how much each well could produce
per day, known as “allowable limits” or “allowables.”19 These allowables were desperately
needed to slow production of oil so that the prices could recover and they also helped ensure
orderly production of oil reservoirs so that they would not be damaged by too-rapid pumping.20
The federal courts quickly struck down these production limits, setting off a multiyear struggle
to enforce these new limits.21
For the next several years, the Railroad Commission and Texas’s governors, Ross Sterling and
Miriam “Ma” Ferguson, fought the courts to impose production controls. The legislature
initially played an unhelpful role, codifying the federal court’s holding against using
“allowables” to raise prices.22 As prices fell further, the Railroad Commission kept trying,
setting new allowable limits again and again, but the courts struck them down each time.23
Governor Sterling declared martial law and sent the National Guard and the Texas Rangers
into the oil fields to enforce compliance with the Railroad Commission’s fleeting production
limits,24 but a combination of court decisions and widespread non-compliance made these
limits ineffective.25

Texas Rangers enforcing limits on East
Texas oil production.
Credit: CLARK & HALBOUTY, THE LAST
BOOM (1972)
In November 1932, the tide turned as the Texas legislature reversed course and authorized
production controls to boost prices.26 And the local industry, understanding its shared interest
in production controls helped the government enforce the Railroad Commission’s new

19

PRINDLE, supra note 7, at 31.
PRINDLE, supra note 7, at 30; Coleman, Third Age, supra note 9, at 410–411; Ely, Legal History, supra note 12,
at 1071–72; P.H. FRANKEL, ESSENTIALS OF PETROLEUM: A KEY TO OIL ECONOMICS (1969) 20; DANIEL YERGIN,
THE PRIZE: THE EPIC QUEST FOR OIL, MONEY AND POWER (1991) 222 (“To dissipate gas through helter-skelter
production was to lose that essential pressure, and thus to leave large amounts of petroleum unrecovered
underground.”); Coleman, Third Age, supra note 9, at 396; Howard R. Williams, Conservation of Oil and Gas,
65 HARV. L. REV. 1155, 1159 (1952) (overdrilling caused “dissipation of native reservoir energy”).
21
DAVIDS, HINTON & OLIEN, supra note 10, at 184; MacMillan v. Railroad Commission of Texas, 51 F. 2d 400,
405 (W.D. Tex. 1931)(holding that Texas law forbid “artificial forcing of prices by governmental action, in cooperation with those in the oil industry interested in raising prices”).
22
PRINDLE, supra note 3, at 31.
23
CLARK & HALBOUTY, THE LAST BOOM (1972) 184.
24
DAVIDS, HINTON & OLIEN, supra note 10, at 166-72; PRINDLE, note 7, at 31.
25
DAVIDS, HINTON & OLIEN, supra note 10, at 184; PRINDLE, supra note 7, at 31; D. Bruce Johnsen, Property
Rights to Cartel Rents: The Socony-Vacuum Story, 34 J.L. & ECON. 177, 184 (1991) (“The highest estimate of hot
oil production puts it at nearly 10 percent of domestic production in July 1934.”).
26
Act of Nov. 12, 1932, 1932 Tex. Gen. Laws, 4th Spec. Sess., ch.2.
20

6

allowable limits.27 As part of the New Deal, President Roosevelt signed first the National
Industrial Recovery Act of 1933, and then the Connally Hot Oil Act of 1935, which forbid
interstate trade in “hot oil” produced in defiance of state allowable limits.28 And the federal
courts finally changed course and upheld the new allowable limits, rejecting the argument that
the Texas legislature’s course reversal had been coerced by the federal government’s support
for production restrictions.29
The Connally Hot Oil Act also authorized a new interstate compact to coordinate state oil
production limits: The Interstate Oil Compact Commission.30 For decades, Texas and the other
states worked through the commission to coordinate the United States’ overall oil production
levels, which produced sixty percent of world oil from 1935 to 1953.31 The federal Bureau of
Mines, working with the Compact Commission, would agree on production levels for each
state.32 Each state would then divide its production quota among its individual oil fields and
wells.33
Texas and the Commission won huge benefits for American producers and consumers and for
the free world. They raised oil prices, immediately boosting oil company profitability and
allowing them to keep reserves that would grow more valuable over time. But they also ensured
smoother prices for consumers over time—rather than being wasted at low prices, oil was
conserved for a time when it would be more valuable.34 Even more important, they ensured
that the United States had the long-term reliable supplies of oil that powered its recovery from
27

CLARK & HALBOUTY, supra note 23, at 186–89.
National Industrial Recovery Act of 1933, Pub. L. 73–67, 48 Stat. 195, enacted June 16, 1933, codified at 15
U.S.C. § 703 (later struck down by the U.S. Supreme Court in (Panama Refining Co. v. Ryan, 293 U.S. 388
(1935)); PRINDLE, supra note 7, at 36–39; Connally Hot Oil Act, 15 U.S.C. § 715 (2000); ROBERT O. ANDERSON,
FUNDAMENTALS OF THE PETROLEUM INDUSTRY (1984) 300; David B. Spence & Robert Prentice, The
Transformation of American Energy Markets and the Problem of Market Power, 53 B.C. L. REV. 131, 184–85
(2012).
29
Amazon Petroleum Corp. v. R.R. Comm’n of Texas, 5 F. Supp. 633, 639 (E.D. Tex. 1934) (noting that “all
agree that a restriction to some extent is essential”). On the series of lawsuits regarding New Deal legislation see
ROBERT H. JACKSON, THE STRUGGLE FOR JUDICIAL SUPREMACY: A STUDY OF A CRISIS IN AMERICAN POWER
POLITICS 115 (1941).
30
Spence & Prentice, supra note 28, at 138 (2012); YERGIN, supra note 20, at 257. The idea for the commission
had been laid out in a book by Northcutt Ely of the United States Department of Interior, who later became a
renowned scholar of international law, conservation, and oil and gas. NORTHCUTT ELY, OIL CONSERVATION
THROUGH INTERSTATE AGREEMENT (1933). See also Owen L. Anderson, Foreword: The Evolution of Oil and
Gas Conservation Law and the Rise of Unconventional Hydrocarbon Production, 68 ARK. L. REV. 231 (2015)
(describing earlier efforts at interstate coordination).
31
WALLACE F. LOVEJOY & PAUL T. HOMAN, ECONOMIC ASPECTS OF OIL CONSERVATION REGULATION (2013)
33-36 (describing the development of the Interstate Oil and Gas Compact Commission from the Oil States
Advisory Committee and noting that “[t]he heart of the immediate emergency program was the limiting of
production by the states”). Texas was the dominant player in these negotiations because it often produced more
than 40% of U.S. oil. PRINDLE, supra note 7, at 71 (Texas production reached 45% of U.S. production by 1953);
for data sources see supra note 11.
32
Ely, Legal History, supra note 12, at 1214–17 (describing the development and operation of the Compact
Commission and noting that although there was no forma; commitment to abide by production allocations “the
compacting states have done so, within reasonable limits”); YERGIN, supra note 20, at 257–59; Howard R.
Williams, Conservation of Oil and Gas, 65 HARV. L. REV. 1155, 1160–63 (1952) (describing how these limits
were set in cooperation with the federal Bureau of Mines and supported by the oil industry).
33
Pickens v. Railroad Comm’n, 387 S.W.2d 35 (1965) (state, field, well).
34
ROBERT MCNALLY, CRUDE VOLATILITY: THE HISTORY AND THE FUTURE OF BOOM-BUST OIL PRICES (2019);
Robert McNally, Commentary: Welcome Back to Boom–Bust Oil Prices, Columbia Center on Global Energy
Policy, Dec. 17, 2015, https://energypolicy.columbia.edu/sites/default/files/commentary-welcome-back-toboom-bust-oil-prices.pdf.
28
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the Great Depression and ultimately fueled the Allies’ victory in World War II and the postwar economic boom.35

III. The Regulator Atrophied and Texas is Now Squandering Its Vast
Resources
Texas is now wasting a tremendous amount of oil and gas. It is flaring—simply burning off—
more gas than some countries consume.36 With rapid gas production and rock bottom prices, it
is also venting and leaking huge amounts of methane directly to the atmosphere.37 And it is
selling oil at bargain basement prices, and paying money to store oil, when it could just wait
until the oil is worth more. Why is Texas continuing to encourage this waste?
The Texas Railroad Commission has forgotten the tools that made its industry the world’s
leader. For the fifty years since the Middle East eclipsed U.S. production, and America became
the world’s biggest oil importer, Texas and the rest of the U.S. states have stopped imposing
statewide production controls to raise oil prices.38 The newly dominant oil producers in
countries such as Saudi Arabia, Iraq, and Venezuela then formed the Organization of Petroleum
Exporting Countries (OPEC) to slow oil production to boost global prices, describing it as “a
kind of international Texas Railroad Commission.”39 The world’s dominant oil producers
always have an interest in slowing oil production to boost prices.40 Conversely, for the past half
century the United States’ energy policy focus turned to maintaining low oil prices to boost the
economy.
But the United States’ long-term strategic goal of low oil prices has now changed for two
reasons. First, the U.S. is now a net energy exporter so it benefits from higher energy prices.41

35

Coleman, Third Age, supra note 9, at 407–08 (summarizing sources describing why World War II “was the first
war fought for oil and determined by oil”); Herbert Feis, The Anglo-American Oil Agreement, 55 YALE L.J. 1174,
1174, 1175–81 (1946) (describing efforts of the U.S. and U.L to develop oil reserves abroad to power post-War
expansion); John C. Jacobs, Unit Operation of Oil and Gas Fields, 57 YALE L.J. 1207, 1207 (1948) (“In less than
a century, petroleum has changed from ‘a peculiar liquid not necessary nor indeed suitable for the common use of
man’ to a substance indispensable to the military security and economic prosperity of a modern nation.”); Rex G.
Baker & Erwin N. Griswold, Percentage Depletion – A Correspondence, 64 HARV. L. REV. 361, 362 (1951)
(“Both in peace and in war the country must have and is very dependent upon oil and gas. Our civilian economy
and the national safety would be jeopardized if we failed to maintain adequate reserves of petroleum.”). See
generally ROBERT GORALSKI & RUSSELL W. FREEBURG, OIL & WAR: HOW THE DEADLY STRUGGLE FOR FUEL IN
WWII MEANT VICTORY OR DEFEAT (1987).
36
Jennifer Hiller, Natural gas flaring hits record high in first quarter in U.S. Permian Basin, REUTERS, Jun. 4,
2019, https://www.reuters.com/article/us-usa-shale- flaring/natural-gas-flaring-hits-record-high-in-first-quarterin-u-s-permian- basin-idUSKCN1T5235. See also Bret Wells, Please Give Us One More Oil Boom – I Promise
Not to Screw It Up this Time: The Broken Promise of Casinghead Gas Flaring in the Eagle Ford Shale, 9 TEX. J.
OIL, GAS & ENERGY L. 319 (2014)
37
Yuzhon Zhang, Quantifying Methane Emissions From The Largest Oil-Producing Basin in the United States
From Space, 6 SCI. ADVANCES 1, 1 (2020) (documenting “Permian methane emissions from oil and natural gas
production” comprising “the largest methane flux ever reported from a U.S. oil/gas-producing region”).
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2006 ENERGY INFO. ADMIN. ANN. ENERGY REV. 309 tbl.11.5; YERGIN, supra note 20, at 664.
39
Gilbert Burck, A Strange New Plan for World Oil, FORTUNE, August 1959, 94, 94.
40
Coleman, State Energy Cartels, supra note 2.
41
U.S. Energy Admin. Info., The United States Is Expected to Export More Energy Than It Imports by 2020, EIA:
TODAY IN ENERGY, Jan. 29, 2019, https://www.eia.gov/todayinenergy/detail.php?id=38152.
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Second, state and federal policymakers have been increasingly concerned about cheap fossil
fuels driving carbon emissions and climate change.42
As a result, there is now a widespread consensus that the United States would benefit from
somewhat higher oil and gas prices. Higher prices would help distressed American energy
companies. Higher prices would reduce flaring, leaking, and venting of methane by
encouraging companies to ensure that all natural gas is sold. Higher prices would encourage
more efficient use of fossil fuels and encourage cleaner alternative technology, boosting the
United States’ emerging clean energy industry and lowering greenhouse gas emissions.
But what can Texas and the United States do to raise energy prices a bit? Texas policymakers
have frequently set their hopes on a production cut by OPEC. Although OPEC, unlike the
United States, already restrains it oil production, the Railroad Commission and U.S. Senators
have repeatedly asked Saudi Arabia to make further cuts to boost global oil prices and help the
American oil industry.43
But why would Saudi Arabia cut its production if Texas will not? The United States produces
60% as much crude oil as Saudi Arabia and it has just emerged from history’s biggest oil
boom—increasing its production at a faster rate than any other country in history.44 And Texas
alone produces more oil than any other member of OPEC.45 The United States produces over
10 times as much oil as most OPEC members, including important oil states such as
Venezuela.46 In fact, the U.S. produces 100 times as much oil as smaller OPEC members like
Gabon and Equatorial Guinea.47
So how can America, the world’s premier energy producer, ask all these nations—Iraq and
Nigeria, Saudi Arabia and Gabon—to impose cuts on their production if U.S. states are not
willing to cut back their much, much greater oil production? The simple answer is that it cannot.
If the United States’ biggest producer does not impose any limits at all in these extraordinary
times, OPEC countries will have little incentive to restrain their production.

42

James W. Coleman, Importing Energy, Exporting Regulation, 83 FORDHAM L. REV. 1357 (2014).
Press Release, Texas Railroad Commission, Christian Passes National Resolution Condemning Oil Dumping,
https://www.rrc.state.tx.us/all-news/072120oildumping/ (“urging the federal government to investigate excessive
dumping of crude oil by Saudi Arabia and Russia”); Press Release, Office of Sen. Ted Cruz, Sen. Cruz on CNBC
Calls
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Saudi
Arabia
to
Stop
Flooding
Oil
Market,
Driving
Down
Prices,
https://www.cruz.senate.gov/?p=press_release&id=5015 (accusing Saudi Arabia of “flooding the market and
driving the price of oil way, way down”).
44
Coleman, Third Age, supra note 9, at 418–19 & n.165. In 2019, the United States produced about 19.5 million
barrels of oil and other liquids per day. And Texas alone produced over 40% of U.S. crude oil. U.S. ENERGY INFO.
ADMIN.,
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&
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45
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International: Petroleum and Other Liquids Production, https://www.eia.gov/international/data/world/petroleumand-other-liquids/annual-petroleum-and-other-liquids-production.
46
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IV. Restoring Texas Leadership: Making the Railroad Commission a
World-Class Regulator
The Railroad Commission is still the world’s most-watched oil and gas regulator because of
the reputation it developed as it fostered the modern oil industry in the Twentieth Century. It
accomplished this by letting the free market work within production levels that it set in
coordination with the Interstate Oil Compact Commission and the federal government. Texas’s
production limits ensured that oil and gas was not wasted during times of low prices. Instead,
oil and gas was produced over time to ensure smooth prices and maximum value for Texas’s
industry.
The past decade’s oil boom has pushed the Railroad Commission to the center of the world’s
stage again. When the Texas Railroad Commission considered oil production cuts in April
2020, 86 countries and 49 states tuned in to watch.48 Texas is the center of the global energy
industry and the oil and gas world is waiting for Texas’s leadership.
The Railroad Commission’s regulatory muscles have atrophied after years of disuse. The
Commission must rebuild its capacity to prevent oil and gas waste and lead world oil markets.
To accomplish this, it must adopt a three part plan.


First, it must begin phasing in modest, flexible cuts to the total volume of natural gas
production to raise prices and reduce gas flaring and venting when gas prices at West
Texas’s Waha hub fall below $1.00/MMBTU, as they have several times in the past
two years.



Second, it must work to reinvigorate the Interstate Oil & Gas Compact Commission,
and work with the federal government and oil states to stabilize oil and gas production.



Third, it must quickly improve its data collection to define the scope of the waste
problem, calibrate its response, and assess whether its measures are succeeding.

A. Phase-In Flexible Gas Production Cuts to Slow Flaring and Venting
Texas law prohibits waste of oil and gas, including “physical or economic waste,” “production
of oil in excess of transportation … or reasonable market demand” and “permitting any natural
gas well to burn wastefully.”49 In other words, waste is when companies are forced to produce
or flare oil and gas now that would be worth more in the future.50
Texas should commit to phasing in cuts on the total amount of gas produced and flared anytime
natural gas prices at West Texas’s Waha hub fall below $1.00 per MMBTU. In the last two
years, natural gas prices have fallen below zero on multiple occasions.51 So oil companies that
invested in gas gathering lines and paid to transport their gas to the market hub would find that
they had to pay others to take their gas away. This plainly destroys the incentive to invest in
48
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Christi
Craddick,
@ChristiCraddick,
https://twitter.com/ChristiCraddick/status/1250228036642971648?s=20.
49
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50
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51
U.S.
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Admin.,
Natural
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Weekly
Update,
Mar.
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Twitter,

26,
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natural gas capture and transport and drives the staggering amount of flaring and venting seen
in Texas in recent years.
A firm commitment to modestly restrain production during these periods of very low prices
would encourage companies to invest in gathering lines, pipeline transport, and leak detection
to ensure all of the gas they produced would be sold at market. During periods of low prices,
Railroad Commission prorationing would help companies coordinate to ensure prices did not
drop too low. The Commission should exempt the smallest producers and allow companies to
trade their allowable limits, so that companies without flexibility could pay other producers,
including the smallest producers to further restrain their production.52
Modest natural gas limits would help consumers and the environment as well. Consumers
benefit from consistent low prices, but suffer when prices fall so low that they encourage flaring
and venting. Flaring and venting squanders vast quantities of gas that, if properly managed,
would ensure a long-term supply of affordable natural gas. And reliable, long-term gas supplies
can be used to replace dirtier sources of energy in the United States and around the world.53

B. Re-invigorate the Interstate Compact Commission
As the center of world energy production, Texas should work with the Interstate Oil & Gas
Compact Commission to coordinate further state cuts to smooth the price of oil and gas. The
Railroad Commission should also take a leadership role in negotiations of world oil and gas
producers, helping the U.S. secure stable energy prices. The world’s dominant oil and gas
producers have always benefited from coordinating to moderate oil production to ensure higher
prices and greater overall profits.54 Texas is in the perfect position to lead a new collaboration,
starting with the United States and expanding to include other friendly nations and discussions
with OPEC.
If Texas imposes gas prorationing, it will somewhat constrain oil production as well, since
flared gas generally comes from wells that are drilled for their oil production. The impact of
gas prorationing on oil will be limited by trading, which will allow over-compliance from
companies that can cut gas with less impact on their oil production and under-compliance from
companies that, conversely, cannot cut their gas production without seriously impacting their
gas production.
When Texas, as the premier oil producer in the world’s biggest oil producing country, cuts its
oil and gas production, it will give it the credibility to negotiate further cooperation with the
other U.S. states and oil producers around the world. Oil and gas production are falling anyway,
but if Texas imposes limits on its production, it can ask other oil producers to reciprocate. Many
states would be eager to work with Texas, the federal government, and the Interstate Oil and

52

This is the approach taken by the Canadian province of Alberta in successfully prorationing its oil production
to increase the oil industry’s cash flow. Coleman, State Energy Cartels, supra note 2.
53
Id.; Adebola Kasumu et al., Country-level Life Cycle Assessment of Liquefied Natural Gas Trade for Electricity
Generation, 53 ENVTL. SCI. & TECH. 1735 (2018); James W. Coleman & Sarah Jordaan, Clearing the Air: How
Canadian Liquefied Natural Gas Exports Could Help the World Meet Its Climate Goals, C.D. HOWE INSTITUTE,
Issue Brief (2016).
54
Coleman, State Energy Cartels, supra note 2; MCNALLY, supra note 34.
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Gas Compact Commission to boost oil prices across the United States.55 Texas should lead and,
through the Interstate Oil & Gas Compact Commission, ask other states to cut their production
as well—particularly the two other leading oil producers, New Mexico and North Dakota,
which are also flaring and venting large quantities of natural gas.
Furthermore, OPEC countries understandably want some cooperation from a country that
produces 10 or 100 times more than they do. Even if Texas prorationing would be largely
symbolic, it would give U.S. negotiators a crucial talking point in encouraging restraint from
other oil producers. Russia and the OPEC nations are hurting from low prices and eager for
any sign of cooperation from the United States that would justify further cutbacks. If the U.S.
oil states imposed even modest prorationing, OPEC countries would have justification for
rewarding U.S. restraint with more cuts. And other oil producers, such as Canada and Norway,
would likely be willing to join these efforts.
A modest production cut would have other significant benefits for the oil industry. First, by
slightly raising oil and gas prices, it would limit economic chaos—fewer bankruptcies and less
oil and gas wasted in episodes of negative pricing. Second, it would activate force majeure
clauses that would give companies a grace period to satisfy contractual obligations, helping
them preserve oil and gas jobs.

C. Build a World-Class Data Collection and Presentation
Texas is the center of the global oil industry and it deserves world-class data to calibrate its
regulations, assess their effectiveness in real time, and inform its industry and policymakers. It
is inexcusable that when oil companies asked the Railroad Commission to consider
prorationing, one of the primary concerns was whether the Commission even had the data to
smoothly implement production cuts.56
Oil companies know more than ever about their well-by-well production and the Railroad
Commission should collect and present the same information to fine-tune its regulations. Oil
companies are now able to remotely monitor their wells’ production and throttle back or
increase their production to respond to temporary price swings.57 If the Railroad Commission
had the same data, it would be much easier for it to phase in production controls so that they
would maximize oil revenue and minimize disruption to energy markets.
In particular, the Railroad Commission should collect, and to the extent practical, publicly
present, real-time data on:
55

As in the prime years of the Interstate Oil & Gas Compact Commission, the Compact Commission would be
exercising its authority to prevent “wasteful burning of gas” and the “avoidable waste” of oil and gas. Joint
Resolution Consenting to an Extension and Renewal of the Interstate Compact to Conserve Oil and Gas, ART.
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authorized to engage in “stabilizing or fixing the price” of oil and gas “or create or perpetuate monopoly”. Id. at
ART V. But since its inception, it has always coordinated the efforts of states to coordinate production controls
designed to raise prices. See supra notes 26–33, and accompanying text.
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1)

Well-by-well production to monitor how the market is responding to prorationing
and to economic conditions.

2)

Transport on oil and gas pipelines to monitor for opportunities to better use
midstream infrastructure.

3)

Prices of natural gas at the Waha hub and other market hubs to monitor the impact
of prorationing.

Real-time data will allow the Commission to immediately see the impact of natural gas
prorationing as it is phased in and ensure the public and the industry that it does not cut too
much or too rapidly.
If necessary, the Texas legislature should authorize funds to better collect and present this data.
For example, if the legislature is considering making funds or financing available for oil
companies in response to the downturn caused by the global pandemic, it should ask these
companies to share more real-time data with the regulator to upgrade the Commission’s
capabilities.
As one model, the Railroad Commission could look to the Electric Reliability Council of Texas
(ERCOT), which manages Texas’s electric grid. In 2012, ERCOT launched a mobile
application that provides real-time prices, demand, and operating reserves.58 ERCOT’s nimble
management and data transparency has made it a model for energy regulators and policymakers around the world.59 Texas’s world-leading oil and gas industry should have an equally
transparent and effective regulator.

V. Conclusion
Texas is the center of the world’s oil & gas industry and it deserves a world-class oil and gas
regulator. The Texas Railroad Commission built the modern oil and gas industry by slowing
its production to ensure its profitability during Texas’ Twentieth Century oil boom. Its success
became the model for OPEC and the global oil industry. As it emerges from history’s biggest
oil boom, Texas must rediscover and modernize these tools to ensure the continued economic
health of the oil industry. It should move quickly to restrain gas production to stop natural gas
flaring, venting, and leaking, reinvigorate the Interstate Oil and Gas Compact Commission, and
modernize its data collection and presentation.
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